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ABSTRACT
Trade credit extended to suppliers in the video game industry does not serve as a commitment device
for large customers in determining which vendors to make relationship-specific investments in.
Suppliers of video games are better off investing in relationships with trade creditors than seeking out
large customers. The costs of large customer relationships are lower sales growth and less long-term
debt financing. Also, large customers do not form relationships with suppliers in this industry that have
high research and development expenditures nor do they facilitate economic viability with regard to
continued independent operational performance or listing on a stock exchange.
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“Many 21st Century business ninjas received some of their earliest training from
video games. They fit the gamer stereotypes in their youth. Maybe they were
alienated, pimple-faced geeks. Perhaps they were losers, slackers, nerds. But
everyone is awkward and alienated in puberty and adolescence. What is it about
video games that contributed to marking the geeks of the 20th Century into the
innovative entrepreneurs of the 21st Century?” 2
I.
Introduction
The video gaming sector is known for its innovation by entrepreneurs. The
early 1980s is considered to be the golden age of the video game and arcade industry,
followed by advancement in gaming technology in the 1990s.3 However, the golden
age diminished in the 2000s, when many entrepreneurial firms entered the market and
quickly went out of business. Today, many entrepreneurs pursue fame and fortune by
developing smartphones and social gaming platforms like Zynga (Mafia Wars) and
Rovio (Angry Birds), despite the fact that the majority of video game software
releases are commercial failures.4
What receives minimal investigation in the literature is how each component
of the vertical integration supply chain—vendor, supplier, and customer— impacts
financing, intangible relationship investments, and survivability of the supplier firm.
There is little research on whether the type of financing or the ability to contract with
large, economically important customers decreases the likelihood of failure for
publicly-listed gaming suppliers. On the one side, it is not unusual for suppliers in
industries with a large degree of innovation and turnover to experience credit
rationing that may impede their ability to fulfill orders from large customers (Freear
and Sohl, 2001; Gadenne, 1998). Existing studies suggest that having a business-tobusiness relationship with a large customer in a manufacturing industry is considered
to be valuable to suppliers due to lower perceived risk by creditors and more stable
sales growth (Kale and Meneghetti, 2014; Fine, 1998; Tyndall and Kamauff, 1998).5
This assertion, however, implies that suppliers gain from establishing relationships

2

Jordan Shapiro, Feb 15, 2014, How video games nurtured a generation of entrepreneurs, Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanshapiro/2014/02/05/how-video-games-nurtured-a-generation-ofentrepreneurs/#36270c30c8f3.
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_age_of_arcade_video_games
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_failures_in_video_gaming
5 Instead, most of the literature shows that large customers benefit from having dedicated suppliers (Johnson,
Kang, and Yi, 2010).
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with large customers. Yet, creating intangible relationship investments has not been
empirically tested for suppliers in this entrepreneurial product sector.
On the other side of the vertical supply chain, these same dedicated suppliers
are customers of vendors that provide them with raw material and different product
inputs. Many suppliers finance inventory with accounts payable trade credit for
operational needs. Few studies, however, examine how financing along the vertical
supply chain within an entrepreneurial industry affects the supplier’s incentive to
make and maintain intangible relationship investments. Is accounts payable
financing related to suppliers’ tendency to have product market transactions with
large customers, and is the value of an intangible relationship tied to higher sales
growth, more long-term debt, greater research and development intensity, or the
probability of being defunct?
Understanding how the supplier’s ties to large customers or its trade credit
partners affects the firm’s ability to survive financial problems and remain a public
entity is an important part of the trade credit literature. Brau, Fawcett, and Morgan
(2007) suggest that competition forces firms in creative industries to increase
organizational effectiveness by working closely with key customers. They and others
state that many entrepreneurial firms rely on the resources and knowledge of their
key customers and suppliers to compete successfully. It is unknown, however,
whether publicly traded suppliers’ ability to take advantage of investment
opportunities that come from selling to large customers is related to their access to
accounts payable trade credit from vendors.6 To our knowledge, no existing study in
entrepreneurial finance analyzes this issue. Researchers mainly surmise that access to
capital and relationships with key stakeholders contribute to the success and initial
survivability of many small businesses and IPOs. Few authors examine the
importance of vendor-supplier-customer relationships across the vertical supply
chain.7
We find that large customer relationships do not facilitate supplier firm
survival in the video gaming sector, a volatile and rapidly changing market. The
existence of an economically important customer is associated with lower sales
growth and less long-term leverage. Those suppliers with atomistic customers grow
at a faster rate and have greater long-term debt. Moreover, suppliers linked to large

6

Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) provide evidence from a survey that covers 48 countries, that on
average 19.7% of all investment is financed with trade credit. Similarly, Cunat and Garcia-Appendini (2012) show
that 60% of small businesses rely on suppliers for operations.
7 Instead, most studies concentrate on success factors associated with start-ups, early stage ventures, and
established ventures (Allen and Hall, 2008; Brown, 2005; Duchesneau and Gartner, 1990; Robb, 2002).
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customers do not have higher research intensity or a better chance of remaining an
independent entity than other similar suppliers. Therefore, within the video gaming
sector, intangible customer relationships are not value-adding investments.
In contrast, video gaming suppliers that receive substantial accounts payable
trade credit from their own vendors are actually less likely to have large, economically
important customers. The intangible relationship investment in their vendors appears
to be beneficial given that these firms have the largest sales growth and the least
likelihood of being defunct. Thus, the ability of suppliers to obtain accounts payable
funding should be more of a credible signal of supplier longevity to the capital
markets than the existence of large customers. It is important for entrepreneurs in
this industry with scarce resources to cultivate inter-firm alliances with trade creditors
more so than with large customers.
II.
Literature Review
Numerous studies identify factors that influence both a firm’s demand for and
supply of credit such as firm age, size, and cash levels (Berger and Udell, 1998;
Cuñat, 2007; Watson and Everett, 1996; Liu, Woodlock, Qi, and Xie, 2006).
However, none of the above papers discuss how a supplier’s ability to get accounts
payable trade credit funding is related to relationships with large customers (Allen
and Hall, 2008; Brown, 2005; Bull and Willard, 1993; Choi and Stack, 2005;
Colombatto and Melnik, 2007; Covin and Slevin, 1990; Duchesneau and Gartner,
1990; Gadenne, 1998; Gartner, Starr, and Bhat, 1998; Lechler, 2001; Lumpkin and
Dess, 2001; Keeley and Roure, 1990; Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley, 2000;
Timmons, 1994; Vesper, 1990). The papers’ findings that large customer
relationships are an important determinant of small private firms’ ability to survive
do not focus on suppliers’ importance as customers in the vertical supply chain, nor
do they consider the value of intangible investment in trade creditor relationships
(Coleman, 2005; Moro, Lucas, and Grim, 2012). 8
The existence of a large, economically important customer can be detrimental
for small publicly listed suppliers with respect to survival or sales growth if a game
becomes unpopular or the economy falls into a recession (Bartholomew, 1999;
Blackwell, 1997; Christopher and Ryals, 1999; Dell and Fredman, 1999). Arend and
Wisner (2005) find that small to medium-sized enterprise (SME) performance

8

Much of the empirical evidence on the validity of each of these theories of trade credit has been done using the
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), carried out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank
on a sample of small US firms.
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declines when supply chain relationships become more intertwined. However,
Wynarczyk and Watson (2005) show that from 1993 to 1999, inter-firm partnerships
increased sales growth rates for 34 SME U.K. subcontractors, known to obtain the
majority of their business from members of their supply chain network. In contrast to
Arend and Wisner (2005), their results suggest that developing close, long-standing,
strategically important relationships with customers or providers of financing creates
a competitive advantage.
Other research finds that leverage, volatility in the macro economy, and
research and development intensity (R&D) are also related to the value of having a
large customer or a supplier relationship. Supplier and customer product market
considerations impact a firm's capital structure decision through two channels. The
first channel relates to how the firm's debt level affects its investment decisions. In
most studies, relationship-specific investment is measured with two variables: the
customer and supplier’s R&D expenses, and the presence of a strategic alliance or
joint venture between the two. In the second channel, high leverage reduces the
bargaining power of a supplier as well as its share of the economic surplus (Hennessy
and Livdan, 2009).
Limited empirical research provides evidence on the relationship between
supplier-customer alliances and both debt financing and R&D investment decisions
(Chemla and Faure-Grimaud, 2001; Chu, 2012; Kale and Meneghetti, 2014).
Building on the intuition of Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991),
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) and Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that both
customers and suppliers strategically choose to have low debt levels to induce the
other party to undertake relationship-specific investments. Kale and Shahrur (2007)
find that both a customer and suppliers’ leverage is decreasing in the intensity of the
industries’ R&D level. A supplier that is dependent on a major customer for a
significant portion of its sales maintains lower debt and competes in industries with
high levels of R&D.
Another possible benefit of a supplier having either a large customer or access
to trade credit is an increase in sales. Fabbri and Klapper (2009) and Daripa and
Nielsen (2005) find that firms use trade credit to foster sales. In earlier studies,
Boissay and Gropp (2007), Meltzer (1960), and Nilsen (2002) show how different
types of firms use trade credit at different phases of the business cycle. Marotta (1997)
performs a similar analysis on a sample of Italian firms and reports that trade credit
partially absorbs the effects of a monetary contraction on firms. Similar to Kohler,
Britton and Yates (2000), the authors find that large companies provide extra trade
credit financing to smaller firms during recessionary periods or when the monetary
policy tightens.
Yet, Opler and Titman (1994) theorize that large customer relationships may
not be as valuable as trade creditor ties during recessions because a bankruptcy

6
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disrupts a supplier’s ability to fulfill product and service demands. Maksimovic and
Titman (1991) extend this supposition by showing that large customer firms may be
reluctant to buy a product from a firm near bankruptcy or financial distress, even in
the absence of liquidation costs. The supplier may renege on its implicit contractual
obligation, e.g. product quality guarantees. Suppliers in captive product market
relationships may have a higher likelihood of becoming defunct due to the lack of
diversification among customers.9
Some studies theorize that the likelihood of being defunct can be minimized
by suppliers’ fostering trade credit relationships. Wilner (2000) models how firms
with a higher default risk should prefer to borrow from trade creditors. In our analysis,
his theory is consistent with suppliers needing large amounts of accounts payables to
fund supply chain activities for large customers. An empirical implication is that
suppliers avoid bankruptcy, delisting, distress, and acquisition by relying on funding
from trade creditors.
Profitability and cash liquidity are other important factors. Ferris (1981)
argues that trade credit may emerge as a natural way to reduce costs inherent in a
firm’s cash management. In his paper, selling to large customers enables suppliers to
better predict when the timing of the cash flows will occur, which eliminates the need
to liquidate assets or to obtain an overdraft facility, thereby reducing the likelihood
of delisting and deceased operations (see also Emery, 1984). As an extension, we
examine whether accounts payable is as an efficient way for video game suppliers to
obtain relationships with large customers.
It is possible that large customer relationships are not facilitated by access to
trade credit, given that suppliers that rely on a few big customers typically have larger
accounting returns and operate more efficiently in terms of selling, general, and
administrative expenses and inventory turnover (Patatoukas, 2012). Well managed
and profitable firms have less liquidity needs.

9

Baranchuk and Rebello (2011) develop a model predicting that bankruptcy affects firms along the supply chain
with respect to rivals, suppliers, and customers. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) study the wealth effects
of financial distress and bankruptcy filings for customers and suppliers of a filing firm. Evidence of linkages and
contagion among firms along the supply chain exist because suppliers of filing firms experience negative
abnormal returns during customer firms’ bankruptcy filing and in the pre-filing distress period. Interestingly, they
do not find evidence of contagion to the customers of a filing supplier firms. As such, the causality appears to be
only from the customer to the supplier. Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian (2012) also find that suppliers experience
a negative abnormal return around the pre-filing distress date of a large customer, and suppliers continue to extend
credit to their distressed customers.
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III.
Gaming Firms Failures and Consolidations
In direct business-to-business relationships, partnerships are an essential part
of supply chain management for firms in entrepreneurial industries, especially in
today’s intensive scale driven, technology economy. Pressured to meet competitive
demands in an industry with a high failure rate, some suppliers choose to create
partnership-style relationships by focusing on customers that represent a large portion
of their sales.
As a form of outsourcing in the gaming industry, large customers are
increasingly reliant on their suppliers to reduce costs, improve quality, and develop
new products faster than rival vendors. In fact, experts in a 2004 Harvard Business
Review article advise U.S. corporations to build supplier keiretsu similar to their
Japanese rivals.10 Yet, this same article states that the 1980s experiment to limit the
number of suppliers at large corporations failed, on average, because U.S. firms
continued to focus on costs instead of continuous improvement and loyalty. In
essence, supply chain integration and aggregation between customers and their
suppliers does not necessarily create more value.
Aoyama and Izushi (2003) describe how the video game industry is comprised
of large and small console manufacturers, video game publishers, and video game
development firms. The entrepreneurs in this industry need a variety of skills, ranging
from technically-oriented computer programming to graphic artistry. All sectors of
the industry continually have new entrepreneurs that create more realistic graphics
and faster response games that provide opportunities for engineers, programmers, and
novices (Izushi and Aoyama, 2006). Nolan Bushnell, considered a founding father of
the industry, states, “… we provided a place for creative people to be part of
something completely new. These were people who wanted to create something
intellectually stimulating and fun. They wanted to put their talent into making games,
not bombs” (Sheff, 1993).
However, little is known about the benefits and costs of maintaining a
relationship with large customers in the gaming industry. For large customers in an
entrepreneurial industry, suppliers are hopefully a part of the strategic plan to
maintain competitiveness and innovation. Since technological breakthroughs are
critical, customers should have a long-term outlook on suppliers’ product
development process. For similar reasons, a supplier may gain from working with a
large customer in terms of survival, access to long term debt, more research and
development, and higher sales growth. If so, having a large customer would enable

10

https://hbr.org/2004/12/building-deep-supplier-relationships
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captive suppliers to obtain more accounts payable from their trade creditors, in
addition to long-term debt due to a positive signaling effect. To our knowledge, it is
unknown whether there are greater benefits to supply chain partnerships for suppliers
in entrepreneurial industries that engender close business relationships with large
clients.
The gaming industry is faced with tumultuous competition, constantly
changing consumer preferences, and rapidly evolving technologies. According to Jain
and Ramdas (2005), firms in an evolving technology environment need to frequently
reposition their products through innovation from research and development to
respond to internal and external shocks in a timely manner. If the reaction time is too
slow, the firm’s products have a higher likelihood of failure and, thus, a lower chance
of forming a cooperative relationship with large, economically important customers.
Relationships with large customer firms may also enable suppliers to reach
economies of scale (Jeppesen, 2005). Another possibility, however, is that businessto-business collaborative relationships may only form after suppliers reach
economies of scale due to the success of a standardized video game or product that
receives loyal end-user following for an extended period of time.
Consistent with definitions of an entrepreneurial industry and the trend in
number of firms in Table 1, disruptive technologies cause a high amount of new firm
entry or exit (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Klepper, 1996). Over 200 independent
video game developers operate in the US today, with most working under the typical
structure of an advance from a customer.11 This entrepreneurial space is dominated
by large publishers like Electronics Art who control the game flow from suppliers
and develop their own games internally.
As seen by Table 1, development in the video game industry has grown
exponentially from 1990-2014. Not surprisingly, the number of firms quintuples in
2000. Since 2002, there has been a steady decrease in the number of firms, but in
2014, there are still double the number of firms compared to 1990. At the same time,
we observe that firms become defunct almost each year. In fact, over the sample
period, 60% of the firms become defunct.
The failure rate for publicly-traded video game firms is consistent with Titman
(1984) and Maksimovic and Titman’s (1991) assertion that unique products with
short life cycles impose potential liquidation-related costs on suppliers and customers
that undertake relationship-specific investments. And while the failure rate for this
industry is relatively high, most years we observe new publicly traded entrants.

11
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Table 1: Number of Firms
This table reports the number of video gaming and arcade firms classified by SIC code 7372 in the
universe of CRSP firms from January 1990-December 2014. The numbers include all sample firms,
those linked with at least one large customer and those that are not. The third column reports the
number of firms that become defunct each year. Firms are categorized as defunct if they are delisted
from the exchange during the sample period. The fifth column presents the number of new entrants to
the video gaming and arcade industry.

Year

Number of Firms by Year
% of
Total
Defunct
Total

Entrants

1990

56

7

12.5%

-

1991

50

5

10.0%

1

1992

47

3

6.4%

2

1993

48

1

2.1%

4

1994

47

5

10.6%

0

1995

46

2

4.3%

4

1996

47

8

17.0%

3

1997

38

2

5.3%

0

1998

43

5

11.6%

7

1999

45

4

8.9%

7

2000

244

17

7.0%

203

2001

259

40

15.4%

32

2002

226

34

15.0%

7

2003

197

32

16.2%

5

2004

177

18

10.2%

12

2005

164

16

9.8%

5

2006

172

16

9.3%

24

2007

165

19

11.5%

9

2008

146

19

13.0%

0

2009

132

17

12.9%

5

2010

121

16

13.2%

6

2011

115

8

7.0%

10

2012

105

11

10.5%

0

2013

105

7

6.7%

11

2014

101

4

4.0%

3
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Therefore, the information asymmetries in the video game sector provides an ideal
experiment for how uncertainties in the product market are an important part of trade
credit decisions and supply chain relationships.
The focus on video game firms extends the research on the importance of
entrepreneurship for publicly traded firms. For example, Johnson, Koo-Kang, and Yi
(2010) argue that large publicly-traded customers have a certifying role in their
supplier's initial public offering (IPO). Their results show that IPO firms with large
customers experience higher IPO valuation and exhibit better long-term operating
performance, especially when the product is unique. A similar argument can be made
about video game suppliers. Those firms with large customers could have relatively
more accounts payable because they are predicted to honor their trade credit
obligations more so than other vendors with small clients. Our analysis is unique to
the entrepreneurial finance literature, and it extends Smith’s (1987) theoretical
analysis on how uncertainty in the product market provides a more complete theory
of trade credit.
IV.
Hypotheses
The importance of supply chain relationships between suppliers, their key
customers, and their vendors is particularly relevant in the video game and arcade
industry, which is expected to grow rapidly due to the expansion of gaming platforms,
cloud technology, and mobile phones. In this industry, disruptive technology can
either be a chance for great riches for companies that continue to innovate or an
insurmountable setback that will sink a supplier, as seen in Table 1. According to
Black, Burton, and Johnson (2009), firms able to maintain their innovative strategies
by improving upon the product (or service) they offer are able to meet the long-term
needs of their customers, which should result in increased sales growth and greater
access to capital.
Few studies, however, examine whether suppliers’ access to trade credit is
related to relationship specific investments in large customers. Our paper specifically
tests whether the existence of an economically-linked supplier-customer relationship
is related to several performance measures. By doing so, we help clarify the
opportunities and potential problems that exist for firms in vertical supply chain
relationships.
Hypothesis 1 evaluates whether the difference between suppliers in a linked
relationship with a large customer is related to the level of accounts payable as a
percentage of total assets or profitability, as defined by return on assets.
H1: The existence of a large customer is more related to the level of accounts
payable trade credit financing and the linked supplier’s profitably than for unlinked
suppliers in the gaming industry.
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The next set of hypotheses considers the costs and benefits of having an
economic link with a large customer. Investment and financing opportunity theories
predict that an advantage of having an economically significant relationship with a
large customer is stable, increasing sales. Williamson (1975) comments that suppliers
and customers agree to invest in specialized relationships when future sales growth is
expected to be profitable.
H2: Economically linked suppliers have larger sales growth than unlinked
suppliers.
In the context of our analysis, another possible benefit is that a large customer
understands the importance of constant innovation, which may lead to more research
and development funding.
H3: Economically-linked suppliers have higher research and development
than unlinked suppliers.
Moreover, other lenders could interpret access to accounts payables or an
economically-linked relationship with large customers as a positive signal of a
supplier’s creditworthiness and reliability, which would increase long-term debt
financing. Alternatively, as previously discussed, bargaining theory predicts that
linked suppliers reduce leverage in order to reduce customers’ ability to extract a
greater share of the surplus. In this case, unlinked firms should have higher debt than
linked firms.
H4: Economically-linked suppliers have different levels of long-term debt
leverage than unlinked suppliers.
Lastly, given that limited access to capital markets increases small firms’
dependence on trade credit, major supply chain disruptions can lead to death spirals
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). When this occurs, management often responds by cutting
research and development and new investments due to an inability to obtain new
sources of capital. The reduction in sales then leads to a decrease in profitability,
which then increases the probability of the firm being defunct through bankruptcy,
liquidation, or acquisition. We extend the literature by examining whether large
customers help smaller, young economically-linked suppliers avoid the death spiral.
From a supplier’s perspective, the death spiral is a serious possibility because
customers in an industry that constantly depends on innovation might quickly switch
to a new vendor with the latest technology, more popular video game, or cloud
gaming ability. If an important customer severs its relationship, a supplier will
experience a sharp fall in demand for its products, which will dramatically decrease
sales and potentially lead to failure.
In contrast, the presence of deep pocket vendors that provide accounts payable
can act as an insurance device if trade credit serves as liquidity for suppliers. Petersen
and Rajan (1997) find that trade credit is more often extended to firms in financial
distress, but only when they expect an increase in the flow of sales. In addition,

12
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Wilner (2000) and Cuñat (2007) document that vendors tend to provide liquidity
support to growing firms facing financial difficulties. What is unknown in the
entrepreneurial finance literature is whether suppliers benefit from having a
relationship with key customers or vendors or do either supply chain partners step
aside and allow the supplier to become defunct. For example, did large customers or
vendors support mobile giant Zynga, the developer of the smash hit mobile game
Words with Friends, when the firm laid off 520 employees after several consecutive
quarters of losses? Hypothesis 5 tests this conjecture for all publicly trade suppliers
in the video game industry.
H5: Economically-linked suppliers have lower incidences of being defunct
and delisted from exchanges than unlinked suppliers.

V.
Sample and Data
We restrict our sample to the universe of publicly-traded firms from January
1990-December 2014 with SIC code 7372 in CRSP, for a total of 682 unique firms.
12
In order to determine whether supplier-customer relationships are beneficial or
detrimental to publicly traded suppliers, we divide the sample into economicallylinked (285) and unlinked firms (397) that either do or do not have customers
representing at least ten percent of their sales. Following Cohen and Frazzini (2008),
we identify the linked firms based on the supplier-customer relationships. Regulation
SFAS No. 131 requires management to disclose the existence of corporate customers
that make up at least ten percent of suppliers’ sales. As a result, we are able to
designate suppliers that file Regulation SFAS No. 131 as economically-linked to a
client from the Compustat KeyCustomers Segment database.13 In the analysis, the
subsample of suppliers with at least one large customer is differentiated from the
subsample with atomistic clients with the dichotomous variable Linked. Linked

12

U.S. Department of Labor provides a more detailed definition of SIC code 7372 firms. More specifically, these
firms specialize in applications, computer games, operating systems, and utility software.
13 The collection process is tedious because Compustat does not report the names of the customer firms
consistently over the sample years. For instance, Microsoft appears as “MICROSOFT,” “MICROSOFT CORP,”
and “MICROSOFT CP.” Therefore, we use an algorithm to match the customer name to the corresponding firm
listed on CRSP and Compustat. We then manually verify that each customer firm is correctly matched. In cases
where we cannot match a customer name or the match is ambiguous, we remove the observation from the sample,
consistent with Cohen and Frazzini (2008).
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equals one for those listed in the Compustat’s KeyCustomers Segment file, and zero
otherwise.14
Our sample is comprised of 10,273 firm-quarter observations. Data for firmspecific variables are obtained from the following sources: Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings
database, and Thomson Financials Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).
The specific variables considered are the number of years listed on the stock
exchange, size, return on assets, negative equity, accounts payable, research and
development (R&D), change in sales, cost of goods sold, cash, leverage, recessionary
periods, institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and whether the firm is listed on
the NASDAQ exchange. We winsorize variables at the 5% and 95% level to avoid
outliers driving the results for this unique industry. All variables are defined in the
tables.
Tables 2 provides summary statistics for the sample as a whole, and for the
economically-linked and unlinked suppliers. Panel A reports the firm characteristics
for all the video gaming firms in our sample. In Panel B, the univariate analysis shows
preliminary differences between the economically-linked and unlinked suppliercustomer subsamples. In each subsample, the average length of time that the firm has
been listed on a stock exchange is 20-21 years. Publicly traded firms in the gaming
industry are relatively established, primarily trading on NASDAQ. NASDAQ firms
represent 74.2 and 82.3 percent for unlinked and linked firms, respectively. Other
univariate differences are that linked suppliers have higher accounts payable as a
percentage of total assets, research and development as a percentage of total assets,
and cash as a percentage of total assets than unlinked suppliers. On average, linked
suppliers have lower fixed costs as a percentage of sales and lower long-term debt.
Institutional ownership and the existence of analysts covering the firm are not
significantly different between the two samples.
Consistent with the industry’s failure rate in Table 1, the more detailed
summary statistics on ROA in Panel C reveal that a majority of the firms in the
unlinked and linked subsamples have negative performance (the mean ROA is -0.50
percent). At the 20th percent quintile, the average ROA for the unlinked and linked
firms are -34.1 percent and -38.1 percent, respectively. Skewness is prevalent given
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The dichotomous variable identifies linked suppliers with a six-month lag after the actual filing date. The
rationale for this variable specification approach to ensure that market participants and stakeholder firms are aware
of the economic link between the two firms (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Fama and French, 1993).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table presents the firm characteristics of the video gaming and arcade sample firms (SIC code 7372) each quarter from January 1990December 2014. In panel A, statistics are presented for all sample firms, those linked with at least one large customer and those that are
not. In Panel B, statistics are presented for the subsample of linked and unlinked firms. Linked is a binary variable equal to one if the firm
has at least one large customer that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and zero otherwise. LogME is the natural log of the market
capitalization of the firm. Market capitalization is the price times the number of shares outstanding. Age equals the number of years that
the firm has been listed on the exchange. ∆Accounts Payable is the change in accounts payable during the quarter. Accts Payable equals
the accounts payable scaled by total assets. R&D equals the research and development expense scaled by total assets. ROA equals the
operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. ∆Sales equals the change in sales during the quarter. COGS equals the cost of
goods sold scaled by sales. Cash equals cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets. Recession is a binary variable equal to one
if the quarter is classified as a recessionary period according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, and zero otherwise.
Longtermdebt Dummy is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has long term debt during the quarter, and zero otherwise. Longtermdebt
equals total long-term debt scaled by total assets. Neg Equity Dummy is a binary variable equal to one if the book value of equity for the
quarter is negative, and zero otherwise. ∆Instit Ownership is the change in institutional ownership during the quarter. Instit Ownership
equals the number of shares held by institutions scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Analystcoverage Dummy is a binary variable
equal to one if the firm has at least one analyst estimate reported for the quarter, and zero otherwise. NASDAQ is a binary variable equal
to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ exchange, and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Panel C presents the average ROA for each quintile, sorted by ROA, of all firms and the subsamples.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for All Gaming Firms
Linked
LogME
Age
∆Accts Payable
Accts Payable
R&D
ROA
∆Sales
COGS
Cash

N

Mean

Min

Max

StdDev

Median

10273
9561
10273
10273
10273
10273
8171
10273
10273
10273

0.079
11.928
20.818
-0.005
0.049
0.027
-0.071
-0.004
0.378
0.248

0.000
4.043
9.000
-0.043
0.006
0.000
-0.441
-0.325
0.080
0.000

1.000
19.101
35.000
0.045
0.197
0.096
0.088
0.475
1.071
0.765

0.270
1.912
7.488
0.022
0.052
0.027
0.152
0.204
0.273
0.249

0.000
11.922
19.000
-0.001
0.029
0.021
-0.004
0.015
0.313
0.181

Copyright © 2015 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance. All rights reserved. ISSN:
2373-1761.
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Recession
Longtermdebt Dummy
Longtermdebt
Neg Equity Dummy
∆Instit Ownership
Instit Ownership
Analystcov Dummy

10036
9420
9108
9420
10273
10273
10273

0.194
0.500
0.070
0.057
-0.006
0.290
0.571

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.060
0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000
1.863
1.000
0.105
0.969
1.000

0.396
0.500
0.153
0.232
0.043
0.338
0.495

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.110
1.000

NASDAQ

10273

0.749

0.000

1.000

0.434

1.000

Panel B: Summary Statistics for Linked and Unlinked Firms
Unlinked
Linked
N
Mean
N
Mean
LogME
Age
∆Accts Payable
Accts Payable
R&D
ROA
∆Sales
COGS
Cash
Recession
Longtermdebt Dummy
Longtermdebt
Neg Equity Dummy
Instit Ownership
∆Instit Ownership
Analystcoverage Dummy
NASDAQ

8786
9461
9461
9461
9461
7444
9461
9461
9461
9242
8662
8370
8662
9461
9461
9461
9461

11.927
20.897
-0.005
0.049
0.026
-0.070
-0.005
0.383
0.244
0.195
0.510
0.072
0.056
0.289
-0.007
0.568
0.742

775
812
812
812
812
727
812
812
812
794
758
738
758
812
812
812
812

11.941
19.900
-0.004
0.053
0.037
-0.087
0.007
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.327

Differences
Diff
-0.014
0.997***
-0.800
-0.001**
-0.011***
0.017***
-0.012
0.056***
-0.048***
-0.560
0.129***
0.023***
-0.007
-1.330*
-0.006***
-0.030*
-0.081***

t-stat
(-0.22)
(4.22)
(0.43)
(-2.09)
(-11.39)
(2.69)
(-1.45)
(5.71)
(-5.11)
(0.13)
(6.99)
(4.77)
(-0.76)
(-1.75)
(-4.05)
(-1.69)
(-5.69)
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Q1-Low
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5-High

Panel C: Average ROA Quintiles
ROA
All
Unlinked
-0.345
-0.341
-0.059
-0.057
-0.005
-0.005
0.013
0.013
0.039
0.040

Linked
-0.381
-0.087
-0.013
0.010
0.037

that at the 80th percent quintile, the average ROA for unlinked and linked firms are only 4.0 percent and 3.7 percent
respectively.
VI.
Results
A. Determinants of an economically linked supplier-customer relationship
The first hypothesis tests whether economically-linked suppliers have different levels of profitability and
funding from trade creditors than unlinked suppliers. It is plausible that entrepreneurial suppliers within the gaming
industry increase their likelihood of a business relationship with a large customer by having access to trade credit.
This supposition is plausible given that, for many small businesses, trade credit is the major source of funding that
enables management to continue operating (Giannetti, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Thus, trade creditors could
provide funding that results in accounts payables to suppliers that helps them meet the demands of large customers
on a timely basis. To ensure sufficient economies of scale, suppliers with large fixed costs may particularly need
both access to accounts payables and large customers. Moreover, large customers may be reluctant to form a business
relationship with less profitable suppliers unless trade creditors are willing to provide them funding.
In Table 3, regression (1) presents the results from a logistic model estimating the likelihood of being an
economically linked supplier. The dependent variable, Linked, equals one if the supplier has at least one customer
representing at least ten percent of its sales, and zero otherwise. Inconsistent with signaling theory, suppliers with
the largest accounts payable are less likely to have large customers based on the coefficient of -0.095 on Accts
Payable. Instead, those suppliers with the least trade credit funding have linked relationships with large clients and
rely more on long-term debt sources. The coefficient of 0.196 on Long Term Debt is statistically significant at the
1% level.
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Technical solvency is also an important predictor of a supplier’s relationship
with a large customer. The coefficient on the negative equity dichotomous variable
of -0.423 is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, suppliers that are technically
in default are much less likely to have a relationship with large customers in the
entrepreneurially oriented gaming industry. Yet, consistent with economies of scale,
suppliers with larger fixed costs, as measured by cost of goods sold as a percentage
of sales, are more likely to have a large, economically important customer.
Interestingly, firms with the most research and development (R&D) or cash
as a percentage of sales have the fewest large customers. The coefficients on R&D
and Cash variables are -0.31 and -0.09, respectively. Apparently, large customers
prefer to form alliances with suppliers at a more mature stage of product development.
Those firms with cash have a more diversified customer base.
As a sensitivity test, models (2) and (4) substitute firm size for firm age as a
publicly traded firm. The coefficients on age in both models (0.119 and 0.169,
respectively) are statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the interaction variable
ROA*Age has a highly significant coefficient of 0.146. These results are consistent
with profitable, older publicly traded suppliers relying on large customers for
business. As stated previously, the most distressed suppliers are shunned by large
customers.
B. Do large customers help suppliers increase sales growth?
The second hypothesis predicts that an advantage of having a relationship with
a large customer is increased sales. It is probably easier and more cost effective to
sell more products or services to a current large customer than to try to convince
smaller customers to switch from their existing vendors. Having at least one large
customer should enable a supplier to better understand customer expectations within
a competitive and volatile industry that requires constant innovation.15 To examine
this issue, Table 4 provides the results from regressions that test whether sustained
sales growth is a benefit of having an economically-linked relationship.
The results in Table 4 are inconsistent with the third hypothesis. In model (1),
the coefficient on Linked is statistically insignificant, and in model (2) the coefficient
is significantly negative. Thus, large customers are correlated with lower sales growth
for suppliers. Additional findings reveal that suppliers should strategically align
themselves with trade creditors. In models (1) and (2), the coefficients on Accts
Payable are positive and statistically significant (0.027 and 0.042, respectively). As

15

Sample firms have between one and five major customers. A majority (64%) of the firms have only
one large customer.

Copyright © 2015 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial
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Table 3: Likelihood of Being a Linked to a Large Customer
This table presents the results from a logistic regression that predicts whether or not firms are linked
to a large customer. The dependent variable is Linked, which equals one if the firm has at least one
large customer that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and zero otherwise. R&D equals the research
and development expense scaled by total assets. Longtermdebt equals total long-term debt scaled by
total assets. LogME is the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm. Market capitalization is
the price times the number of shares outstanding. Age equals the number of years that the firm has
been listed on the exchange. Accts Payable equals the accounts payable scaled by total assets. ∆Sales
equals the change in sales during the quarter. Cash equals cash and short-term investments scaled by
total assets. COGS equals the cost of goods sold scaled by sales. Instit Ownership equals the number
of shares held by institutions scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Analystcoverage Dummy is
a binary variable equal to one if the firm has at least one analyst estimate reported for the quarter, and
zero otherwise. Neg Equity Dummy is a binary variable equal to one if the book value of equity for
the quarter is negative, and zero otherwise. ROA equals the operating income before depreciation
scaled by total assets. All variables except binary variables are normalized to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation χ2-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Linked
Intercept
R&D
Longtermdebt
Accts Payable
Cash
COGS
Instit Ownership
Analystcov
LogME

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2.476***
(1,075.42)
-0.312***
(61.67)
0.196***
(13.07)
-0.095**
(4.80)
-0.086**
(4.31)
0.203***
(18.41)
-0.049
(0.79)
0.136
(1.68)
-0.094*
(3.06)

2.501***
(1,103.53)
-0.305***
(59.95)
0.161***
(9.33)
-0.079*
(3.36)
-0.088**
(4.70)
0.199***
(18.40)
-0.099*
(3.64)
0.105
(1.02)

2.392***
(866.29)
-0.299***
(51.90)
0.204***
(13.15)
-0.105**
(5.34)
-0.026
(0.29)
0.203***
(16.47)
0.037
(0.32)
0.066
(0.31)
0.204***
(13.15)

2.367***
(861.85)
-0.257***
(42.15)
0.202***
(13.15)
-0.083***
(3.42)
0.050
(1.01)
0.208***
(17.46)
-0.003
(0.00)
0.026
(0.05)

Age
Neg Equity

-0.423**

0.119***
(7.77)
-0.315*

0.169***
(12.85)
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(2.77)

ROA
Neg Eq*LogME

Spring 2017

0.086*
(3.61)

0.057
(1.30)

-0.159
(0.85)

Neg Equity*Age

-0.257
(1.45)

ROA*LogME

0.034
(0.60)

ROA*Age
Pseodu R2
Obs

0.146***
(8.13)
4.01%
9,052

4.04%
9,108

3.93%
7,562

such, trade credit funding should be an important part of a supplier’s strategic plan.
Our results are consistent with firms in the gaming industry needing good and reliable
trade creditors, an important aspect of supply chain management. It appears that an
alliance with trade creditors increases suppliers’ competitiveness.
C. Do large customers benefit suppliers by encouraging suppliers’ R&D?
Ruyter, Moorman, and Lemmink (2001) state, “the level of complexity and
inherent perceived risk involved in customers’ relationships in high-technology
markets leads to an intricate interplay of factors determining commitment and trust
that in turn affect customer intentions to remain in the relationship.” Their concerns
about customer loyalty and collaboration with their suppliers is very relevant for
video game developers. To stay competitive, R&D is the life line of these suppliers.
Few studies examine whether large customers form relationship investments by
investing in suppliers with relatively large R&D expenses. Dass, Kale, and Nanda
(2014) find that a firm’s accounts payables is positively related to its supplierindustry’s relationship specific investment level as measured by R&D. The
underlying premise is that R&D leads to relationship-specific investments resulting
from the specialized nature of the products and technology. It is unclear whether this
premise holds in the video game industry.
The high failure rates within this industry may cause skepticism in small, less
informed customers resulting in delayed or postponed purchases of the suppliers’
products or services, which might make it beneficial for the supplier to link
themselves with large clients. Suppliers most likely have greater communication with
large customers in order to conduct forward-looking, primary research that decreases
the likelihood of product market failure for both constituents. Given that R&D is a

9.24%
7,579
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Table 4: Change in Sales
This table reports the results from OLS regressions that explain the change in sales. The dependent
variable is ∆Sales, which equals the change in sales during the quarter. Linked is a binary variable
equal to one if the firm has at least one large customer that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and
zero otherwise. Accts Payable equals the accounts payable scaled by total assets. ROA equals the
operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Recession is a binary variable equal to one
if the quarter is classified as a recessionary period according to the National Bureau of Economic
Research, and zero otherwise. Age equals the number of years that the firm has been listed on the
exchange. LogME is the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm. t-statistics are reported in
the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Intercept
Linked
Accts Payable
Linked*Accts Payable
ROA
Recession
Recession*Linked
Recession*Accts Payable
Age

Dependent variable: ∆Sales
(1)
(2)
0.093***
0.108***
(8.66)
(10.24)
-0.036
(-0.99)
0.027**
(2.40)
0.019
(0.59)
-0.006
(-0.55)
-0.042***
(-3.98)
0.017
(0.47)
0.005
(0.54)
-0.005
(-0.46)

LogME
R2
Obs

-0.020
(-0.56)
0.042***
(3.71)
0.004***
(0.13)
-0.037***
(-3.54)
-0.031***
(-2.94)
0.012
(0.34)
0.004
(0.41)

0.109***
(9.78)
0.32%
7,969

1.43%
7,850

hit-or-miss opportunity that relies on experimentation rather than proven sales, large
customers may facilitate greater relative expenditures on R&D by accepting higher
rates of development failure in order to mutually benefit from suppliers’ continuous
learning process. An informal joint collaboration could be a form of loss risk-sharing
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if suppliers know that they will be rewarded with loyalty for paying for R&D that
helps both management understand customer firms’ problems and opportunities in
the gaming industry.
An underlying assumption for the third hypothesis is that large customers
create competitive advantages from intangible asset production because they have an
educated understanding of R&D knowledge specificity. This allows linked suppliers
to have a long-term horizon when developing a strategic plan related to innovation
and R&D. This assertion is the theoretical underpinning for the highly touted lean
strategy. In fact, lean strategy encourages customers and suppliers to share
information about new-product planning, product conception, design, and pricing. In
order to compete, customers need to have an understanding of suppliers’ market
positioning and the innovation demands of the industry and vice versa.
Yet, it is unclear whether large customers actually support linked suppliers’
R&D initiatives. Raman and Shahrur (2008) show that suppliers can exaggerate
expected sales and engage in earnings management. In Table 5, the results show that
linked suppliers do not have higher increases in R&D expenditures than unlinked
suppliers. The only statistically important variable is change in sales of the prior
period. For completeness, in unreported tests, the change in R&D is replaced with the
level of R&D expenses. In the unreported analysis, the linked variable remains
statistically insignificant.
D. Do customers benefit suppliers by helping them obtain sources of long-term
debt as a substitute or compliment to trade credit?
As previously discussed in the literature review section, large customers in
industries with customized products or technology may be reluctant to link
themselves to a supplier with high leverage due to the risk of default or distress. It is
predicted that suppliers will limit their use of debt financing to signal a reduced
default risk to the potential large customer. The rationale is that if the supplier
liquidates or reneges on its contractual obligations due to default, the large customer
will be forced to face substantial switching costs. Thus, low leverage and reliance on
long-term debt sources are implicit assurances of the supplier’s ability to fulfill their
obligations over an extended period of time. Titman and Wessels (1998) present
evidence that firms in durable goods industries choose lower debt ratios partially in
order to not impose high relationship investment costs on their suppliers, but they do
not examine if suppliers make similar debt financing decisions with respect to longterm debt and trade credit, nor discuss this issue for an entrepreneurial industry. To
our knowledge, empirical evidence showing that supplier-customer relationships in a
high-technology environment such as the gaming industry is scarce. Hypothesis four
predicts that linked suppliers have lower leverage and greater reliance on long term
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debt. The empirical results from the analysis are provided in Table 6. Panel A
estimates the level of long-term debt as a percentage of total assets, and Panel B
estimates the likelihood of a supplier having long-term debt.
The results in Table 6 are consistent with suppliers choosing to have less longterm debt as a percentage of total assets when they are economically-linked to a large
customer. The coefficient of -0.18 in model (1) of Panel A is statistically significant
at the 1% level. This finding along with the result that linked suppliers are more likely
to include long-term debt in their capital structure is consistent with low leverage
being used as an implicit assurance of credibility. Their own trade creditors, however,
appear to not need the same assurances from supplier firms given that long-term debt
leverage in Panel A is slightly higher than when accounts payable is low (coefficient
of 0.03 in model 1), and supplier firms tend not to have less long term debt as accounts
payable increases.
As expected, insolvent (profitable) firms with negative equity (positive ROA)
have a lower (higher) likelihood of having long-term debt and a lower long-term debt
leverage ratio. What is interesting is that linked suppliers have a higher probability of
having long-term debt than unlinked suppliers during recessions. Larger size and
older corporations have less need for credibility by having large long-term debt
leverage ratios than smaller and younger firms in the video game industry.
E. Do customers benefit suppliers by lowering the likelihood of being delisted?
Given that suppliers in the video game industry have higher exit rates, it is
important to directly analyze whether large customers develop relationships with
suppliers that have the highest rate of survival. Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008)
and Kale and Shahrur (2007) build on the work by Titman and Wessels (1988) by
theorizing that firms in a linked relationship select a capital structure policy that takes
into consideration the effect of liquidation on suppliers and customers.
Baranchuk and Rebello (2011) present a theoretical model showing that all
stakeholders along the supply chain are negatively impacted by bankruptcy,
liquidation, or any other event that severs the relationship between a supplier and its
large customers. Empirically, Kolay, Lemmon and Tashjian (2012) and Hertzel et al.
(2008) report that the wealth effects surrounding financial distress and bankruptcy
filings are negative for suppliers, but not for the filing firm’s customers.
We re-examine this issue in hypothesis five and present the results of a logistic
model predicting a change in the supplier and customer relationship due to the firm
being defunct, as defined by delisting from a stock exchange due to liquidation,
bankruptcy, distress, or acquisition. Including acquisition of the supplier by an
unaffiliated acquirer is important because the former relationship-specific
investments could lose value if the new vendor severs the business relationship with
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Table 5: Change in R&D
This table reports the results from OLS regressions that explain the change in research and
development (R&D). The dependent variable is ∆R&D, which is the change in the research and
development expense scaled by total assets during the quarter. Linked is a binary variable equal to one
if the firm has at least one large customer that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and zero otherwise.
∆Sales equals the change in sales during the quarter. Cash equals cash and short-term investments
scaled by total assets. Longtermdebt equals total long-term debt scaled by total assets. Recession is a
binary variable equal to one if the quarter is classified as a recessionary period according to the
National Bureau of Economic Research, and zero otherwise. LogME is the natural log of the market
capitalization of the firm. Market capitalization is the price times the number of shares outstanding.
Age equals the number of years that the firm has been listed on the exchange. Age equals the number
of years that the firm has been listed on the exchange. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Intercept
Linked
∆Sales
Cash
Longtermdebt
Recession
Accts Payable
Linked*∆Sales
Linked*Longtermdebt
Linked*Recession
LogME
Age
R2
Obs

Dependent variable: ∆R&D
(1)
(2)
0.012
0.013
(1.54)
(1.60)
0.019
0.017
(0.66)
(0.59)
0.019**
0.018**
(2.17)
(2.05)
-0.013*
-0.014*
(-1.67)
(-1.81)
-0.002
-0.004
(-0.25)
(-0.55)
0.001
0.002
(0.14)
(0.29)
0.001
0.007
(0.10)
(0.98)
-0.043
-0.043
(-1.59)
(-1.57)
0.022
0.020
(0.62)
(0.56)
-0.037
-0.037
(-1.37)
(-1.36)
-0.015*
(-1.80)
0.000
(-0.04)
0.17%
8,612

0.14%
8,660
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Table 6: Debt Financing
This table reports the results from OLS regressions (panel A) and logistic regressions (panel B) that
explain and predict the likelihood of debt financing. In panel A, the dependent variable is
Longtermdebt, which equals total long-term debt scaled by total assets. In panel B, the dependent
variable is Longtermdebt Dummy, which equals one if the firm has long-term debt during the quarter,
and zero otherwise. Linked is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has at least one large customer
that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and zero otherwise. Accts Payable equals the accounts
payable scaled by total assets. R&D equals the research and development expense scaled by total
assets. Recession is a binary variable equal to one if the quarter is classified as a recessionary period
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, and zero otherwise. ROA equals the
operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Neg Equity Dummy is a binary variable
equal to one if the book value of equity for the quarter is negative, and zero otherwise. LogME is the
natural log of the market capitalization of the firm. Market capitalization is the price times the number
of shares outstanding. Age equals the number of years that the firm has been listed on the exchange.
Age equals the number of years that the firm has been listed on the exchange. χ2-statistics are reported
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Predicting Level of Long-term Debt Financing
Dependent variable: Longtermdebt
Intercept
Linked
Accts Payable
Recession
ROA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.036***
(2.89)
-0.186***
(-4.45)
0.030**
(2.49)
-0.033***
(-2.62)
0.006
(0.46)

-0.068***
(-6.56)
-0.176***
(-4.97)
-0.049***
(-4.95)
-0.031***
(-3.00)

0.025**
(2.03)
-0.194***
(-4.68)
0.086***
(6.74)
-0.018
(-1.41)
-0.025**
(-2.00)

-0.068***
(-6.66)
-0.168***
(-4.75)
-0.059***
(-5.99)
-0.028***
(-2.75)

Neg Equity
Recession*Linked
Recess*Accts Pay
LogME
Age

0.064
(1.55)
0.016
(1.38)

1.869***
(39.22)
0.049*
(1.37)
0.012
(1.30)

0.056**
(1.38)
0.018***
(1.56)
0.161***
(12.18)

1.897***
(39.80)
0.056
(1.58)
0.014
(1.48)

0.071***
(7.32)
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R2
Obs

Intercept
Linked
Accts Payable
Recession
ROA
Neg Equity
Recession*Linked
Recess*Accts Pay
LogME

0.46%
7,575
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2.38%
7,562

Panel B: Predicting Likelihood of Debt Financing
Dependent variable: Longtermdebt Dummy
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.093***
-0.015
-0.076***
(15.16)
(0.45)
(9.77)
0.544***
0.542***
0.564***
(43.56)
(47.96)
(46.11)
-0.073***
-0.104***
-0.170***
(9.81)
(24.40)
(45.66)
-0.020
-0.016
-0.048**
(0.66)
(0.55)
(3.93)
0.070***
0.123***
(8.88)
(25.81)
-0.377***
(16.49)
0.148*
0.134*
0.168**
(3.18)
(2.81)
(4.04)
-0.028
-0.033
-0.032***
(1.57)
(2.65)
(2.06)
-0.278***
(113.14)

Age
Pseodu R2
Obs

15.41%
9,101

(4)
-0.014
(0.39)
0.533***
(46.30)
-0.393***
(17.91)
-0.019
(0.77)

-0.393***
(17.91)
0.127
(2.51)
-0.035*
(2.96)

-0.077***
(13.55)
1.20%
7,729

1.46%
9,413

3.93%
7,562

the customer (Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen, 2015; Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi, 2015). Losses
occur when dedicated assets cannot be redeployed if the original supplier is either
liquidated, restricted by bankruptcy rules, or acquired. It is not clear if large customers
are committed to distressed suppliers.
In contrast to established theory, the value of a firm in the video game industry
does not crucially depend on the implicit guarantees they have with their large
economically-linked customers. In Table 7, the coefficients on Linked are statistically
insignificant in models (1) and (2). The size or age of the supplier are much more
important. Older firms have a lower probability of being defunct as evidenced by the

1.65%
9,413
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-0.16 coefficient in model (2). What is surprising is that larger firms (0.63 coefficient
on the LogME) have a larger probability of being defunct. More detailed analysis
reveals that larger video game firms are the most attractive acquisition targets by
customers, their own vendors, or other competitors. For a similar reason, suppliers
with the most positive ROA are more likely to become defunct. The related targets
and acquirers might explain why the likelihood of being defunct decreases for video
game suppliers during recessions (coefficients in models (1) and (2) are -0.07 and 0.13). During periods of macroeconomic decline, most firms in this industry do not
perform well. As a result, fewer potential acquirers have the resources to purchase
suppliers.
As expected, the suppliers with the most cash have a lower probability of being
defunct (coefficients in model (1) and (2) of -0.18 and -0.24, respectively). When Age
is included in the logistic regression in model (2), the likelihood of being defunct
decreases with the percentage of accounts payable scaled by total assets (coefficient
in model (2) of -0.09). Likewise, long-term debt reduces the likelihood of being
defunct (coefficients in model (1) and (2) of -0.08).
External monitoring by institutional investors increases the incidence of a
video game supplier being defunct (coefficients of -0.02 and -0.29 in models (1) and
(2)), whereas analyst coverage by at least one expert has the opposite effect
(coefficients of -0.83 and -0.73 in models (1) and (2), respectively). Consequently,
video game suppliers should actively manage their relationships with both institutions
and analysts.
For example, after leaving his position as a video game developer and
designer at Activision, Garry Kitchen founded Absolute Entertainment Inc. on
August 19, 1986 with his brother Dan Kitchen, David Crane, Alex Demeo, John Van
Ryzin. Absolute Entertainment, a video game publishing firm, produced Atari, Sega,
Game Boy, and Nintendo games. Eventually, Absolute Entertainment’s Nintendo
displaced his former employer Activision’s Atari. In December 2007, Activision
merged with its competitor Vivendi Games to form Activision Blizzard. Absolute
Entertainment published more than 30 games before dwindling sales from
diminishing product quality lead to liquidation in 1995. Kitchen formed a new video
game company called Skyworks Technologies immediately prior to ceasing
operations, terminating all employees, and filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. It is no
surprise that large customers do not readily invest in relationships with suppliers in
this industry.
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Table 7: Predicting Defunct Firms
This table reports the results from logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a firm becoming defunct.
The dependent variable is Defunct, which equals one if the firm eventually becomes delisted in the sample
period, and zero otherwise. Linked is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has at least one large customer
that comprises at least 10% of their sales, and zero otherwise. ∆Accts Payable is the change in accounts
payable during the quarter. Accts Payable equals the accounts payable scaled by total assets. ∆Sales equals
the change in sales during the quarter. COGS equals the cost of goods sold scaled by sales. ROA equals the
operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Cash equals cash and short-term investments
scaled by total assets. Longtermdebt equals total long-term debt scaled by total assets. Instit Ownership
equals the number of shares held by institutions scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
Analystcoverage Dummy is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has at least one analyst estimate
reported for the quarter, and zero otherwise. Recession is a binary variable equal to one if the quarter is
classified as a recessionary period according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, and zero
otherwise. LogME is the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm. Market capitalization is the
price times the number of shares outstanding. Age equals the number of years that the firm has been listed
on the exchange. χ2-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Defunct
Intercept
Linked
∆Accts Payable
Accts Payable
∆Sales
ROA
Cash
COGS
Longtermdebt
Instit Ownership
Analystcoverage Dummy
Recession

(1)

(2)

0.382***
(61.87)
0.036
(0.16)
-0.003
(0.01)
0.002
(0.00)
0.010
(0.10)
0.271***
(91.17)
-0.178**
(40.06)
0.087***
(10.38)
-0.081***
(10.55)
0.017
(0.19)
-0.831***
(135.72)
-0.073***

0.328***
(47.91)
0.036
(0.17)
-0.003
(0.96)
-0.089***
(10.67)
0.057*
(3.48)
0.372***
(156.60)
-0.242***
(74.47)
0.035
(1.81)
-0.044*
(3.28)
0.290***
(69.85)
-0.731***
(110.15)
-0.126***
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Linked*∆Accts Payable
Linked*∆Sales
Linked*Recession
ROA*∆Sales
Recession*∆Accts Payable
LogME

(7.65)
-0.036
(0.13)
0.086
(1.00)
0.117
(1.96)
0.036
(2.14)
0.024
(0.71)
0.634***
(317.49)

Age
Pseodu R2
Obs

(23.80)
-0.011
(0.01)
0.084
(1.00)
0.125
(2.29)
0.034
(1.96)
0.026
(0.88)

-0.155***
(36.48)
12.02%
7,562

6.94%
7,575

VII. Conclusion
Most of the literature in finance finds that supplier-customer relationships are
most beneficial to distressed small, private firms and that trade credit is extended
when banks and other financial intermediaries will not. The standard question is not
whether suppliers should seek business relationships with large customers but how
they can take advantage of supply chain relationships. We find that trade credit in the
form of accounts payable is also a very important form of financing for publicly
traded suppliers in the video gaming industry, and that intangible relationship
investment in large customers is less beneficial.
For suppliers in the video game industry, developing and maintaining
relationships with large customers representing a significant portion of sales leads to
lower sales growth, no increase in research and development, less long-term debt, and
no loyalty in terms of the supplier remaining as an independent firm by avoiding stock
market delisting (defunct) either due to liquidation, bankruptcy, demotion to the pink
sheets, or acquisition. Instead, suppliers within this industry gain more value by
developing collaborative relationships with trade creditors, increasing their
bargaining power in the supply chain relationship by strategically pursuing small
customers. Overall, the findings are consistent with trade creditor (large customer)
partnerships increasing (decreasing) suppliers’ competitiveness in the video game
industry. It appears that suppliers can develop long-term relationships of loyalty and
trust with their vendors that help them increase sales and avoid becoming defunct.
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